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SUMMARY
The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alli-
ance, long the anchor of the U.S. security role
in East Asia and the Pacific, rests on shared
democratic values and mutual interest in
Asian and global stability and development.
Alliance cooperation has deepened signifi-
cantly since the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks.  The U.S. maintains about 53,000
troops in Japan, about half of whom are sta-
tioned on the island of Okinawa.  Trade fric-
tion has decreased in recent years, partly
because concern about the trade deficit with
Japan has been replaced by a much larger
deficit with China and the latter’s association
with concerns about the loss of manufacturing
jobs.  For 2004 the merchandise trade deficit
with Japan was about $75 billion, compared
with about $164 billion for China. 
U.S.-Japan relations are of concern to
Members and Committees with responsibili-
ties or interests in trade and international
finance and economics, U.S. foreign policy,
U.S. bases in Japan, ballistic missile defense
(BMD), and regional security.  Congressional
support for security cooperation with Japan
stems in particular from concerns about North
Korea’s nuclear and missile proliferation,
terrorism, and China’s potential emergence as
the dominant regional military power.
In October 2001 the Koizumi
government gained unprecedented parliamen-
tary passage of unprecedented legislation
permitting the dispatch of Japanese ships and
transport aircraft to the Indian Ocean to pro-
vide rear-area, noncombat logistical support to
U.S. forces engaged in the anti-terrorist
campaign in Afghanistan, despite strong
opposition from both within and outside of the
ruling coalition.   A small Japanese flotilla
that has remained on station since late 2001
has supplied about one-third of the fuel needs
of U.S., British and other allied warships up to
the present.  In early 2004 Tokyo sent some
600 noncombat military and reconstruction
support, despite considerable public and
political opposition.  U.S. military bases in
Japan have played a key role in supporting the
military campaign in Afghanistan and the
military buildup and resupply of U.S. forces in
Iraq and adjacent countries.  
Japan’s position toward North Korea
generally has been hardening during the past
several years due to Pyongyang’s nuclear and
ballistic missile programs and to its admission
that it kidnapped Japanese citizens in the
1970s and 1980s.  The Koizumi government,
along with its South Korean counterpart,  has
urged the Bush Administration to be more
flexible regarding the issue of direct talks with
North Korea, but at the same time Japan has
warned that it may impose economic and
financial sanctions if Pyongyang is not more
responsive on the abductions and nuclear
issues.
Due to its concerns about North Korea
and a rising China,  Japan is participating in
joint research and development of a sea-based
missile defense capability and plans to acquire
and deploy two separate U.S. systems begin-
ning in 2006.  The Koizumi government also
has taken steps that could transform Japan into
a more “normal” nation in terms of its security
posture, including calling for a revision of the
anti-war clause (Article 9) of the Constitution
that prohibits participation in collective secu-
rity arrangements.  The U.S. and Japan have
accelerated discussion of reducing the burden
of hosting U.S. bases in Okinawa, in the
context of ongoing bilateral discussions about
U.S. plans for the realignment and transforma-





The Japanese government has yet to lift its ban on imports of U.S. beef, despite an
apparent agreement between U.S. and Japanese government negotiators that beef from cattle
no older than 20-months could be imported.  Japanese government officials now contend that
it is up to the Food Safety Commission, an independent Japanese government body, to make
the final decision on lifting a ban.  The issue has reached the highest political levels.
President Bush urged Prime Minister Koizumi to remove the ban in a March 9, 2005
telephone call.  In addition, Members of the Senate and the House have recommended that
pressure be applied to get Japan to remove the ban quickly.  Japan had been the largest
market for U.S. beef exports.
Reportedly, the beef issue, the problem of  North Korea nuclear weapons program, and
concerns about China dominated the March 18-19 visit to Japan by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice.  The trip was part of an Asian tour that also included China, South Korea,
India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  During the visit to Tokyo Secretary Rice praised Japan for
having “stepped up to wider global responsibilities,” but also reportedly told Prime Minister
Koizumi that “The beef dispute is a very, very important concern of the United States and
it must be resolved urgently,” and that failure to do so could lead to the kind of trade
confrontation that roiled the bilateral alliance in the 1980s.  For their part, Prime Minister
Koizumi and Foreign Minister Machimura reportedly stood their ground, insisting that a time
frame for reopening U.S. beef imports could not be given until the food safety issue had been
resolved.
The visit revealed a steadily increasing degree of U.S.-Japan alignment on regional
security issues, causing a negative reaction in both North Korea and China.  Pyongyang
reacted angrily to Japan’s reported agreement to the Bush Administration’s warning that a
resort to “other measures” might become necessary if North Korea remains recalcitrant about
its nuclear program.  The Chinese government criticized a speech to students at Tokyo’s
Sophia University, during which Secretary Rice indicated that an economically rising China
could be a force for good or ill, depending on its policies, and challenged Beijing to permit
greater political freedom.  Beijing also condemned a joint statement by Secretary Rice and
Minister Machimura to the effect that the China-Taiwan issue was a matter of common
security concern, although the Japanese foreign minister made clear that constitutional
constraints would prevent Japan from becoming militarily involved in a China-Taiwan
conflict.  More broadly, Japan appeared to respond positively to Secretary Rice’s proposal
for a “strategic development alliance program,” described by commentators as intended to
promote democratization in Asia.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Role of Congress in U.S.-Japan Relations
Congress cannot itself determine the U.S. approach toward Japan, but its powers and
actions in the areas of trade, technology, defense, and other policy form a backdrop against
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which both the Administration and the Japanese government must formulate their policies.
As of 2005 several high-profile policy issues were of particular interest to Congress,
including dealing with the confrontation over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs,
anti-terrorism cooperation, Japan’s support for U.S. policy concerning Afghanistan and Iraq,
cooperation on missile defense, and the transformation of U.S. military deployments in Asia.
Congress also has been active in recent years in pushing the Administration to employ anti-
dumping trade penalties against steel imports from Japan and in supporting efforts by
survivors of Japan’s World War II slave labor camps to gain relief through the U.S. courts
by opposing a long-standing U.S. policy that gives primacy to the terms of the 1951 U.S.-
Japan Peace Treaty.
U.S.-Japan Cooperation and Interdependence
 (This section was written by Richard Cronin and Mark Manyin)
The United States and Japan have long sought to promote economic cooperation, an
open global trading system, and regional stability and security.  In economic terms, the two
countries have become increasingly interdependent:  the United States traditionally has been
Japan’s most important foreign market, while Japan is one of the largest U.S. markets and
sources of foreign investment in the United States (including portfolio, direct, and other
investment). The U.S.-Japan alliance and the American nuclear umbrella give Japan
maneuvering room in dealing with its militarily more powerful neighbors.  The alliance and
access to bases in Japan also facilitate the forward deployment of U.S. military forces in the
Asia-Pacific, thereby undergirding U.S. national security strategy.
U.S.-Japan Relations under the George W. Bush Administration.
Historically, U.S.-Japan relations have been strained periodically by differences over trade
and economic issues, and, less often, over foreign policy stances.  Strains arising from trade
issues peaked about 1995, after several years of conflict over the Clinton Administration’s
efforts — with mixed results — to negotiate trade agreements with numerical targets.  Trade
friction has decreased markedly in recently years, though some tension emerged over efforts
by the Bank of Japan to maintain a “weak” yen against the dollar to boost Japanese exports,
and the Bush Administration’s actions to restrict certain types of steel imports from Japan
and other countries.  The most significant bilateral trend in the past five years has been the
steady growth of Japanese security cooperation with the United States, including the first-
ever deployments of Japanese Self-Defense Forces in noncombat support of U.S. military
operations following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Cooperation against Terrorism: Response to the Attacks in New York and
Washington.  The Koizumi government strongly condemned the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and initiated a series of unprecedented measures to protect American
facilities in Japan and provide non-lethal logistical support to U.S. military operations against
Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The latter mainly took the form of at-sea
replenishment of fuel oil and water to U.S., British, French, and other allied warships
operating in the Indian Ocean, and logistical airlift.  A small flotilla of transport ships, oilers,
and destroyers has provided about a third of the fuel used by 10 allied naval forces in the
Indian Ocean since the first deployment in November 2001.  On October 26, 2004, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the sixth six-month extension of the deployment —
until May 1, 2005 — and reported that, in addition, the Japanese flotilla would begin
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supplying fresh water and helicopter fuel for the multinational forces engaged in anti-terrorist
operations in the Indian Ocean.   In a press release on October 28, 2004, the U.S. Defense
Department said that as of mid-October 2004 the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
(MSDF) had carried out 430 refueling operations, involving 100 million gallons of fuel —
some 30 percent of all fuel used by U.S. and allied ships — and that, in addition, the Air
Self-Defense Force (ASDF)  had conducted more than 250 airlift support missions for U.S.
forces with C-130 and U-4 transport aircraft.1  
Japan’s ability to “show the flag” in its first such deployments since the end of World
War II was made possible by the adoption by the Japanese Diet (parliament) at the end of
October 2001 of three related anti-terrorism bills.   One law, the Anti-Terrorism Special
Measures Law, gave unprecedented post-World War II authority to the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) to provide “rear area” support to U.S. forces operating in the Indian
Ocean.  Permitted support includes intelligence sharing, medical care, and the provision of
fuel and water and nonlethal military supplies.  The restriction of the authority to nonlethal
supplies was a domestic political compromise aimed at reconciling Japan’s “no-war”
constitution with the government’s desire to meet the Bush Administration’s expectations
of material support.
Aid to Afghanistan.  After the United States, Japan also has been the leading country
States to Afghan relief and reconstruction.   Japan played a major role, along with the United
States, Saudi Arabia, and the Asian Development Bank in accelerating reconstruction of the
critical highway linking Kabul with Kandahar, in the heartland of the Pushtun ethnic group.2
  
 Support for U.S. Policy toward Iraq.   While strongly preferring a clear United
Nations role in resolving the U.S./British confrontation with Iraq, Japan nonetheless gave
almost unqualified support to the Bush Administration’s position. During an open debate in
the U.N. Security Council on February 18, Japan was one of only two out of 27 participating
countries, the other being Australia, to support the U.S. contention that even if the U.N.
inspections were strengthened and expanded, they were unlikely to lead to the elimination
of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction unless Iraq fundamentally changed its current passive
cooperation.  Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and then-Foreign Minister Yoriko
Kawaguchi called the leaders of several undecided Security Council Members to try to
persuade them to support the U.S. position.
Japan has committed to providing some $5 billion in assistance to Iraq over the next
four years.  In addition, the Koizumi government has deployed about 600 military personnel
 — mainly ground troops — to carry out humanitarian aid and reconstruction activities in
Iraq, about half of a total commitment of up to 1,000 troops.  The deployment has been
highly controversial in Japan.  In mid-October 2004, Japan hosted a conference in Tokyo for
a group of countries and institutions that have pledged funds to support the reconstruction
of Iraq.  Reportedly, although $33 billion had been pledged at a donor’s meeting in
IB97004 03-21-05
CRS-4
September 2003 by the United States, Japan, and other countries and donors, only about $1
billion has been delivered, half of which was contributed by Japan.
Uncertain Response to U.S. Proposals for Realignment of U.S. Forces and
Bases in Japan and South Korea.  The Pentagon’s proposed transformation and
realignment of U.S. forces in East Asia has been met with a mixed response in Japan.
Reportedly, the relevant ministries and agencies in the Japanese government are divided over
the matter.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) reportedly remains committed to a
more narrow scope for bilateral military cooperation, restricted to “the Far East” under the
1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.   On the other hand, according to some accounts, the Japan
Defense Agency (JDA) has been calling for an expanded role for Japanese forces under the
Pentagon’s proposed transformation and realignment of U.S. forces in Europe and Asia in
return for a reduction in the burden on local communities that host U.S. forces.  The JDA and
military services have pushed for changes in the Self-Defense Forces law to elevate
international operations from a “secondary” to a “primary” function, and successfully put
more emphasis on special operations forces in revisions to the five-year National Defense
Program Outline (NDPO) that was adopted in December 2004.  The plan also calls for a shift
away from the defense of Japanese territory, the traditional basis for Japan’s force structure,
toward a force structure that is lighter, more mobile, and more deployable.  The revised force
structure would parallel the U.S. military’s current efforts to “transform” its forces to meet
21st-century threats, and  some observers see the proposal as designed to enable Japan’s Self-
Defense Forces to provide support to U.S. military forces engaged in world-wide
antiterrorism operations. Proposals to transfer the U.S. on Okinawa to areas of mainland
Japan, particularly to Camp Zama on Honshu and/or areas on the northern island of
Hokkaido, have run into considerable opposition from local politicians.  In January 2005, the
United States and Japan reportedly agreed to establish a set of working groups to discuss
specifics about the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.
U.S.-Japan-China Relations.  At present, Japan seems to view China’s rising power
with deepening concern.  Japanese officials grow uncomfortable when U.S.-China relations
deteriorate, but also when they are too close.  Japan’s own relations with China have been
increasingly strained in recent years as a result of conflicting claims to disputed islands in
the East China Sea,  Chinese intrusions into what Japan considers its 200-mile economic
zone, and Japan’s concerns about China’s rising power and influence.  Japan’s 2005-2009
defense plan for the first time mentions China as a security problem, and Japan has cut its
assistance to China in half since 2000.  For its part, China has objected to the granting of a
visa for a visit to Japan by former Taiwanese president Lee Teng Hui, has complained about
the treatment of Japan’s past aggression in Japanese textbooks, and bitterly objected to
several visits by Prime Minister Koizumi  to the Yasukuni War Shrine, in Tokyo, which
enshrines the names of Japan’s war dead, including a handful of convicted war criminals.
Japan values China’s role in promoting multilateral talks aimed at eliminating North Korea’s
nuclear program, but Tokyo also worries about the concomitant expansion of China’s
regional influence.
Converging Korean Peninsula Priorities? In September 2002, Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang for a historic summit with Kim Jong-il
that momentarily restarted normalization talks between the two countries, which have not
established official relations since North Korea was founded in 1948.  During the visit, Kim
Jong-il admitted to Koizumi that North Korea had abducted 13 Japanese nationals in the
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1970s and 1980s and that only five remained alive.  News of the unexplained deaths of the
eight abductees, who were relatively young when they disappeared, and Kim’s refusal to
provide information on other suspected abductees outraged public opinion in Japan and
brought about a hardening of Tokyo’s policy toward Pyongyang.  In October 2002, the five
surviving abductees were allowed by the regime to travel to Japan for a visit, but their family
members were not allowed to leave North Korea.  The Koizumi government subsequently
prevented the five from returning to North Korea (perhaps at the abductees’ request) and
demanded that Pyongyang release their family members.  Stalemate over the abductee issue,
combined with the eruption of the North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002, caused
Japan-North Korea normalization talks to stall for a year and a half.  
In May 2004, Koizumi won the family members’ release by traveling to Pyongyang for
another one-day summit.   Koizumi also  pressed Kim Jong-il to abandon his nuclear
weapons program and pledged during the same visit to provide 250,000 tons of rice and $10
million in other aid to the North.  Following Prime Minister Koizumi’s May 2004 visit to
North Korea, however, the Japanese government and the prime minister himself, in meetings
with President Bush at the June 2004 G-8 Summit at Sea Island, GA, began to press for a
more flexible U.S. stance.   Shortly thereafter, the Bush Administration submitted its first and
only detailed negotiating position at the six-party talks (involving North Korea, the United
States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue.
Japan’s position hardened in December 2004, after Japanese DNA tests invalidated North
Korea’s claims that boxes of remains delivered to Japan were those of deceased kidnap
victims.  Following this development, the Japanese government suspended its aid shipments
to North Korea, and calls within Japan for an imposition of sanctions increased.  The Bush
Administration and Congress have supported Japan’s insistence on a full accounting of the
fate of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea.  The North Korean Human Rights Act,
which the 108th Congress passed and President Bush signed into law in October 2004, (P.L.
108-333) U.S. nonhumanitarian assistance to North Korea is made contingent on North
Korea’s “substantial progress” toward fully disclosing information about the abductees. 
While resisting the calls to impose sanctions, Prime Minister Koizumi has said that
normalization talks will not continue unless Pyongyang begins dismantling its nuclear
program and is more cooperative on the abductions issue.  His government also has
toughened enforcement of Japan’s controls on the export of potential dual-use items to North
Korea, and has secured passage of legislation  that would give the government the right to
block visits to Japanese ports by ships deemed to be a security risk and that lack property and
indemnity insurance (less than 5% of North Korean commercial vessels are thought to be
adequately insured).  Between 2002 and 2004, port calls by North Korean ships fell by about
25%, and two-way trade flows decreased by 33%, from about $390 million to around $260
million.  Also, in 2003, the Japanese Diet adopted legislation giving the government the
authority to impose economic sanctions, including the banning of cash remittances to North
Korea, without the previous requirement of specific United Nations or other multilateral
approval.  Remittances to North Korea are thought to have declined significantly since the
early 1990s, though they still are estimated to total tens of millions of dollars a year.  (For
more information,  see CRS Report RL32161, Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected
Issues, by Mark Manyin; CRS Report RL32428, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s May
2004 Trip to North Korea: Implications for U.S. Objectives,  by Richard P. Cronin, and CRS
Issue Brief IB98045, Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations, by Larry Niksch.)
IB97004 03-21-05
CRS-6
Claims of Former World War II POWs and Civilian Internees.  Congress has
also indicated intense interest in another issue in which the U.S. and Japanese governments
have been in essential agreement.  A number of surviving World War II POWs and civilian
internees who were forced to work for Japanese companies during the war have filed suits
in Japan and California seeking compensation of $20,000 for each POW or internee.  Former
POWs and civilian internees had been paid about $1.00-2.50 for each day of internment from
a fund of seized Japanese assets administered by a War Claims Commission (WCC)
established by Congress in 1948.  Numerous suits have been filed in California against
Japanese firms with wartime or pre-war roots, including Mitsui & Co., Nippon Steel, and
Mitsubishi Company  on  grounds that  these companies subjected POWs and internees to
forced labor, torture, and other mistreatment.  Thus far, the Japanese courts and the U.S.
Court of Claims have dismissed the suits on grounds that Japan’s obligations to pay
compensation were eliminated by Article 14 of the 1951 Multilateral Peace Treaty with
Japan.  The State Department  and Department of Justice support the position of the Japanese
government, but a number of Members of Congress have sided with the plaintiffs.  
Two conflicting court decisions in California in early 2003 have further clouded the
prospects for the victims’ claims.  A January 2003 decision by a California appeals court
ruled that the claim against a Japanese company by a Korean-American who was a former
POW could go forward.  A week afterwards, a federal appeals court in San Francisco made
the opposite determination in a case involving the consolidated claims of several thousand
former POWs forced to work in camps run by major Japanese conglomerates.  The latter
decision upheld the long-standing contention  of the State Department that only the Federal
Government had the right to “to make and resolve war,” including the resolution of war
claims.  The core issue is whether the Peace Treaty with Japan relieved only the Japanese
government from future claims or whether it covered private companies as well.  On April
30, 2003, the California Supreme Court agreed to review the two cases and the pertinent state
law, which allows victims of World War II forced labor to sue Japanese multinational
companies that operate in California (Taiheiyo Cement Co. v. Superior Court, no. S113759).
A number of bills and amendments introduced in the 107th Congress sought to block the
executive branch from upholding the supremacy of the Peace Treaty in civil suits. On July
18 and September 10, 2001, the House and Senate respectively adopted similar amendments
to H.R. 2500, the Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary FY2001 appropriations bill,
which would prohibit use of funds for filing a motion in any court opposing a civil action
against any Japanese individual or corporation for compensation or reparations in which the
plaintiff alleges that as an American prisoner of war during World War II, he or she was used
as a slave or forced labor.  In a move that generated controversy, the provisions were dropped
by conferees.  The conference report to H.R. 2500 was agreed to in the House on November
14, 2001, and the Senate on November 15; and signed into law by the President on
November 28 (P.L. 107-77).  The conference report explains that the provision was dropped
because the adamant opposition of the President would have jeopardized the bill, but some
Senators expressed reservations, charging that the provision had been the victim of a
questionable “parliamentary tactic.”  A number of bills and amendments were introduced in
the 108th Congress to achieve the same purposes.  Several of these passed in at least one
house during the first session, but none were enacted.  (For further background, see CRS
Report RL30606, U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian American Citizens Captured and




Kyoto Protocol.  Japan is the fourth-leading producer of so-called greenhouse gases
after the United States, the Russian Federation, and China.  Under the Kyoto Protocol, which
Tokyo ratified on June 4, 2002, Japan is obligated to reduce its emissions 6% below its 1990
levels by 2010.  Japanese industry shares many of the concerns of U.S. industry about the
cost and feasibility of achieving these reductions by the target date of 2012, but the Japanese
government, which places a high value on its support of the protocol, expressed extreme
dismay over the Bush Administration’s decision to back away from the protocol. 
Security Issues
 (This section was written by Larry Niksch)
Japan and the United States are military allies under a security treaty concluded in 1960.
Under the treaty, the United States pledges to assist Japan if it is attacked.  Japan grants the
U.S. military base rights on its territory in return for U.S. support to its security.  In recent
years Japan has edged closer to a more independent self-defense posture.  A five-year defense
plan for 2005-2009 calls on Japan to become more engaged militarily in the Indian Ocean
region from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, permits military exports to the United States
for development of joint missile defense, mentions China as a security problem (the first such
mention in a five-year plan), and increases the size of rapid reaction forces, whose main
mission is to prevent infiltration from North Korea. 
Japan’s new five-year defense plan for 2005-2009 calls on Japan to become more
engaged militarily in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, permits military exports to the
United States for development of joint missile defense, mentions China as a security problem
(the first such mention in a five-year plan), and increases the size of rapid reaction forces.
An emerging point of Sino-Japanese tensions is the East China Sea, where China and Japan
have overlapping territorial claims over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands and the undersea
mineral resources.  
Issue of U.S. Bases on Okinawa.  Since September 1995, the U.S. military
presence on Okinawa has been plagued by controversy over crimes committed by U.S.
military personnel, especially U.S. Marines, and by plans to reshape the structure of military
bases on the island.  There have been widespread calls on Okinawa for a renegotiation of the
Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a reduction in U.S. troop strength.  The
U.S. and Japanese governments have opposed revising the SOFA, but, in 2001, the United
States agreed to turn over American military personnel suspected of specific grievous crimes
to Japanese authorities prior to formal indictments being issued by Japanese courts. 
Recent U.S. announcements of troop withdrawals from South Korea and plans to
withdraw 70,000 military personnel from Europe and Asia have raised speculation that U.S.
troop strength on Okinawa might be reduced.  In 2004, about 3,000 U.S. Marines from
Okinawa were dispatched to Iraq.  Marine General Wallace Gregson has stated that Marines
could be relocated from Okinawa to bases on the Japanese mainland.  A U.S.-Japanese
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) reached an agreement in 1996 under which
the U.S. military will relinquish some bases and land on Okinawa (21% of the total bases’
land) over seven years, but U.S. troop numbers would remain the same — about 29,000.
Implementation of the agreement has been stalled by the issue of relocation of the U.S.
Marine air station at Futenma, which is in the heart of a densely populated area, to another
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site on the island.   The crash of a Marine helicopter from Futenma at a nearby university
campus in August 2004 reportedly prompted the Pentagon to consider a withdrawal from
Futenma.  Japan’s opposition Democratic Party, which made major gains in December 2003
parliamentary elections, came out in favor of a total U.S. military withdrawal from Okinawa.
Proposed U.S. Command Structure Changes.  In line with U.S. plans for global
and regional force structure changes, the Pentagon reportedly has proposed to Japan two
major command changes.  One would shift the 1st Army Corps headquarters from
Washington State to Camp Zama in Japan.  The second would integrate the 13th Air Force
on Guam into the 5th Air Force command and base the new command at the U.S. Yokota Air
Base, where the 5th Air Force command currently is located.  These changes would make
Japan a greater focal point of the U.S. command structure in the Pacific.
Burden-Sharing Issues.  The United States has pressed Japan to increase its share
of the costs of American troops and bases.  Under a host nation support (HNS) agreement,
Japan has provided about $2.5 billion annually in direct financial support of U.S. forces in
Japan, about 77% of the total estimated cost of stationing U.S. troops.  It was reported that
at a U.S.-Japan meeting in August 2004, Japanese officials suggested that Japan reduce its
HNS on grounds that Japan is now making a greater direct contribution to the alliance.   
Revised Defense Cooperation Guidelines.    U.S. and Japanese defense officials
agreed on a new set of defense cooperation guidelines on September 24, 1997, replacing
guidelines in force since 1978.  The guidelines grant the U.S. military greater use of Japanese
installations in time of crisis. They also refer to a possible, limited Japanese military role in
“situations in areas surrounding Japan” including minesweeping, search and rescue, and
surveillance.  The Japanese Diet passed initial implementing legislation in late May 1998.
The crises often mentioned are Korea and the Taiwan Strait, but another emerging point of
tensions is the East China Sea, where China and Japan have overlapping territorial claims over
the Sankaku islands and the underseas mineral resources.   In January 2005, it was reported that
Japan had developed military plans to dispatch 55,000 troops into the East China Sea area if the
disputes deteriorate into an armed clash.  
Until its unprecedented dispatch of a small naval flotilla and transport aircraft to provide
noncombat logistical support of U.S. forces operating in the Indian Ocean following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Japan had barred its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from
operating outside of Japanese territory in accordance with Article 9 of the 1947 constitution.
Article 9 outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.”
It provides that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be
maintained.”  Japanese public opinion has strongly supported the limitations placed on the SDF.
However, Japan has allowed the SDF since 1991 to participate in a number of United Nations
peacekeeping missions and in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, but in noncombat roles.  As of mid-
August 2004 some 600 ground troops were providing humanitarian relief and reconstruction
assistance in the area around Samawa, in southern Iraq, backed up by air and sea transport units.
Japan’s prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, has advocated that Japan be able to
participate in collective self-defense and broader peacekeeping roles, but he said he would
not seek a revision of Article 9.  In mid-2004, the Bush Administration stepped into the issue
directly, in contrast to the traditional U.S. stance that revising Article 9 should be decided
by Japanese.  Top U.S. officials called for changes to Article 9.  Then-Secretary of State
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Colin Powell said that Japan must revise Article 9 in order to realize its goal of permanent
membership on the United Nations Security Council.  One reported motive for the Bush
Administration’s intervention is that Article 9 is closely linked to the three “non-nuclear
principles,” barring nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered naval ships from Japanese
territory,  that Japan adopted after World War II.  U.S. plans to mothball the remaining non-
nuclear aircraft carrier, currently homeported in Japan, raise questions about the future of the
homeporting arrangement if the non-nuclear principles would bar nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers.
  Escalation of the nuclear crisis with North Korea influenced the passage by the
Japanese Diet in May 2003 of three wartime preparedness bills, which specify the powers
of the government to mobilize military forces and adopt other emergency measures.  The
North Korean situation also sparked a debate in Japan over acquiring offensive weaponry
that could be used to attack North Korea. 
Cooperation on Missile Defense.   A six-year Japan-U.S. program of cooperative
research and development of anti-ballistic missiles began in 1999.  Proponents of missile
defense justify it on the basis of North Korea’s missile program, but China opposes the
program.  U.S. military officials reportedly have recommended that Japan adopt a missile
defense system that combines the ground-based U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
system and the ship-based U.S. Standard Missile-3 system.   Prime Minister Koizumi
announced in December 2003 that Japan would acquire these two U.S. systems.  The
Defense Agency reportedly hopes to begin deploying the missile defense system around
major Japanese cities by 2007.  The total cost to Japan is estimated at close to $10 billion.
(See CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense:  Issues
and Prospects, by Richard P. Cronin.) 
Economic Issues
 (This section was written by William Cooper)
Despite Japan’s long economic slump, trade and other economic ties with Japan remain
highly important to U.S. national interests and, therefore, to the U.S. Congress.  By the most
conventional method of measurement, the United States and Japan are the world’s two
largest economies, accounting for around 40% of world gross domestic product (GDP), and
their mutual relationship not only has an impact on each other but on the world as a whole.
(China’s economy is now larger than Japan’s by another method of measurement: purchasing
power parity.) Furthermore, their economies are intertwined by merchandise trade, trade in
services, and foreign investments.
Although Japan remains important economically to the United States, its importance
has slid as measured by various indicators.  Japan is the United States’s third-largest
merchandise export market (behind Canada and Mexico) and the fourth-largest source for
U.S. merchandise imports (behind Canada, Mexico, and China) as of the end of 2004.  At
one time Japan was the largest source of foreign direct investment in the United States but,
as of the end of 2003, it was the second largest source (behind the United Kingdom).  It was
the fourth-largest target for U.S. foreign direct investment abroad as of the end of 2003.  The
United States remains Japan’s largest export market and second-largest source of imports as
of the end of 2004.
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Because of the significance of the U.S. and Japanese economies, domestic economic
conditions strongly affect their bilateral relationship.  Except for some brief periods, Japan
had incurred stagnant or negative economic growth in the 1990s and the first few years of
this decade.  In 2000, real GDP increased 1.5%, declined 0.5% in 2001, and increased only
0.3% in 2002.  However, in 2003,  Japan’s GDP increased 2.5% and  increased 1.4% (or at
an annualized rate of 5.6%) during the first quarter 2004, but slowed down to just 0.4%
growth during the third quarter of 2004. 
Some long-standing trade disputes continue to irritate the relationship.  The U.S.
bilateral trade deficit with Japan reached $81.3 billion in 2000, breaking the previous record
of $73.9 billion set in 1999.  (See Table 1.)   However, in 2001, the U.S. trade deficit
declined 15%, primarily because of the slowdown in the U.S. economy, but increased
moderately to $70.1 billion in 2002.  The trade deficit  decreased slightly to $66.0 billion in
2003 but increased to $75.2 billion in 2004.
Table 1.  U.S. Trade with Japan, 1996-2004
($ billions)
Year Exports Imports Balances
1996 67.5 115.2 - 47.7
1997 65.7 121.4 - 55.7
1998 57.9 122.0 - 64.1
1999 57.5 131.4 - 73.9
2000 65.3 146.6 - 81.3
2001 57.6 126.6 -69.0
2002 51.4 121.5 -70.1
2003 52.1 118.0 -66.0
2004 54.4 129.6 -75.2
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  FT900.  Exports are total
exports valued on a f.a.s .basis.  Imports are general imports valued on a customs basis.
Another lingering bilateral trade dispute pertains to the Japanese ban on imports of U.S.
beef.  Japan imposed the ban in December 2003, in response to the discovery of a case of
“mad cow” disease in Washington State.  On February 8, 2005, U.S. Agriculture Secretary
Mike Johanns had announced that Japan had accepted the U.S. method for determining the
age of cattle that were the source of processed beef.  This issue had been a point of
contention between the two countries.  However, Japanese government officials now contend
that it is up to the Food Safety Commission, an independent Japanese government body, to
make the final decision on lifting a ban.  The issue has reached the highest political levels.
In a March 9, 2005 telephone call to Prime Minister Koizumi, President Bush urged the
Japanese leader to end the ban.3  Members of Congress have weighed in on the issue as well.
H.Res. 137 (Moran-KS) and S.Res. 87 (Thune-SD) were introduced on March 3 and March
17, respectively.  The resolutions express the sense of the respective Houses of Congress,
that the U.S. government should impose economic sanctions against Japan, if Japan does not
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lift the ban.  Until it imposed the ban, Japan was by far the largest market for U.S. beef and
veal exports, far ahead of second place South Korea.4
Japan, together with other major trading partners, has challenged U.S. trade laws and
actions in the WTO.  For example,  Japan and others challenged the U.S. 1916 Antidumping
law and the so-called Byrd Law (which allows revenues from countervailing duty and
antidumping orders to be distributed to those who had been injured).  In both cases, the WTO
ruled in Japan’s favor.  Legislation to repeal the 1916 law was passed by the 108th Congress.
However, there is strong resistence in the Congress to repealing the “Byrd Law.”  In
November 26, 2004, the WTO authorized Japan and seven other countries to impose
sanctions against the United States, but they have all decided to wait to do so.5
Japan and the United States are major supporters of the Doha Development Agenda, the
latest round of negotiations in the WTO.  Yet, the two have taken divergent positions in some
critical areas of the agenda.  For example, the United States, Australia, and other major
agricultural exporting countries have pressed for the reduction or removal of barriers to
agricultural imports and subsidies of agricultural production, a position strongly opposed by
Japan and the EU.  At the same time, Japan and others have argued that national antidumping
laws and actions that member countries have taken should be examined during the DDA,
with the possibility of changing them, a position that the United States has opposed.
Despite some outstanding issues, tensions in the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic
relationship have been much lower than was the case in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.
A number of factors  may be contributing to this trend:
! Japan’s economic problems in the 1990s and in the first few years of this
decade have changed the general U.S. perception of Japan as an economic
“threat” to one of a country with problems.
! The rise of China as an economic power has caused attention of U.S.
policymakers to shift from Japan to China as source of concern.
! The increased use by both Japan and the United States of the WTO as a
forum for resolving trade disputes has de-politicized disputes and helped to
reduce friction.   
Japanese Political Developments
 (This section was written by Mark Manyin)
Current Situation.  Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s term will end at the latest
in September 2006, when his position as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
expires.  Koizumi already is Japan’s fourth-longest-serving prime minister  since the end of
World War II.  He has entered his last year and a half in office committed to an ambitious
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and agenda that includes such items as revising Japan’s constitution, higher sales taxes, and
privatizing aspects of its postal service.  The controversy raised by some of these items,
combined with his “lame duck” status and the unpopularity of his dispatch of Japanese troops
to Iraq, has cut into his previously high public approval ratings in recent months.  The
erosion in his popularity was particularly noticeable in the July 2004 national elections for
one-third of the seats in the Upper House of the Diet, which the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) controls through a coalition with another party.  Although the LDP largely held
its own in the vote — it lost one seat, to bring its total in the 245-seat chamber to 115 — the
election was seen as a significant setback for Prime Minister Koizumi because the main
opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won 12 new seats to bring it to 82
seats.  Exit polls indicated voters disapproved of Koizumi’s plans to have Japanese Self-
Defense forces join the multinational force in Iraq and to increase mandatory contributions
to the national pension system while cutting benefits.  The DPJ scored particularly well
among all-important independent voters and among the younger generations.
The July Upper House election results matched those in November 2003 elections for
the more powerful Lower House of Parliament, in which the LDP lost seats and the DPJ
scored a big gain in its parliamentary strength.  Both of the DPJ’s victories came largely at
the expense of Japan’s smaller parties, thus appearing to confirm a trend in Japan toward a
two-party system.  The LDP has ruled Japan since 1955, except for a 10-month hiatus in the
1990s.  Despite the DPJ’s gains, the LDP-led coalition still comfortably controls majorities
in both parliamentary chambers, and new elections are not mandated until the fall of 2006.
Koizumi’s Popularity.  The July 2004 elections also marked a nadir for Koizumi’s
popularity, with some exit polls indicating more voters disapproved than approved of the
prime minister’s performance — a first since Koizumi took office in 2001.  Still, Koizumi’s
public approval ratings, which generally hover in the 40%-50% range, are the highest of any
prime minister in decades, and he has tried to use his popularity to reshape the LDP. Until
the July 2004 Upper House vote, the key to Koizumi’s relative popularity had been his
appeal to independent voters, who have emerged as a major force in the Japanese electorate
and tend to back reformist politicians.  That the DPJ beat out the LDP among independents
may indicate that Koizumi is now seen by many as a defender of the status quo, rather than
a reformer.  Indeed, for the first time since Koizumi assumed office, another name — LDP
deputy secretary general Shinzo Abe — has outpolled the prime minister in some polls.
As prime minister, Koizumi has begun seizing the machinery of government away from
the factions that have long dominated the LDP.  Lacking a strong base within the LDP,
Koizumi’s popularity is one of the few weapons he wields against the “old guard” that are
strongholds of the “old economy” interests most threatened by Koizumi’s agenda.  Another
factor that has helped keep Koizumi in power is the absence of any politicians in the LDP
or in Japan’s opposition parties who have the political strength to replace Koizumi in the
near future.  This was a primary reason the LDP overwhelmingly reelected Koizumi to a
new, three-year term as party president in September 2003.  The president of the LDP
traditionally serves as prime minister.
Despite his reformist image, Koizumi’s record on economic reforms generally is judged
to be mixed at best.  Many analysts attribute this to a combination of a lack of focus and
detailed planning by the prime minister’s office, and to opposition from vested interests.  In
April 2004, Koizumi attempted to redouble the impetus behind his reforms by appointing a
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deregulation task force with himself at the head.  Koizumi has been far more assertive on
security issues, spearheading legislation designed to pressure North Korea to cooperate with
the international community, calling for a revision of Japan’s constitution (including its war-
renouncing Article 9), and carrying out controversial military deployments into the Indian
Ocean to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and into Iraq to support the
U.S.-led occupation.
In general, Japan’s political peculiarities constrain U.S. influence on Japanese policy.
Most important, the relative weakness of the Japanese prime minister and cabinet often make
it difficult to for Japanese leaders to reach and then deliver on controversial agreements with
foreign countries.  At present, these structural debilities are compounded by the LDP’s need
to consult frequently with its coalition partners.  U.S. options are further limited by
Koizumi’s enthusiastic participation in the war against terrorism and the war in Iraq, and by
the widely held perception that Koizumi represents the best hope for pushing through
economic reforms the United States seeks.  These beliefs have led the Bush Administration
generally to avoid criticizing Koizumi publicly, for fear of diminishing his political
effectiveness.  
Background — The Political System’s Inertia. Despite more than a decade of
economic stagnation, Japan’s political system and economic policies have remained
fundamentally unchanged.  What accounts for this striking inertia?  Three features of Japan’s
political system give vested interests an inordinate amount of power in Japan:  the extreme
compartmentalization of policymaking; the factional divisions of the Liberal Democratic
Party; and the weakness of the opposition parties.  Many of Koizumi’s most far-reaching
reform proposals actually are attempts to alter the first and second of these characteristics.
 
The Compartmentalization of Policymaking.  To a striking degree, Japan’s
policymaking process tends to be heavily compartmentalized.  Policy debates typically are
confined to sector-specific, self-contained policy arenas that are defined by the jurisdictional
boundaries of a specific ministry.  Each policy community stretches vertically between
bureaucrats, LDP policy experts, interest groups, and academic experts.  Unlike in most
industrialized societies, each policy arena in Japan is so self-contained that cross-sectoral,
horizontal coalitions among interest groups rarely form.  One reason for this is that
bureaucrats are paramount in most of Japan’s policy compartments.  Only in matters
involving highly politicized industries such as agriculture and security policy have politicians
and interest groups become significant players in the policymaking process.  Even in these
areas, responsibility for carving out the details of policy still rests with the bureaucrats, in
part because Japanese politicians often only have a handful of staffers to assist them. 
Furthermore, the LDP’s policymaking organ, the Policy Affairs Research Council
(PARC), itself is segmented into specialist caucuses (often called “tribes” or zoku), so that
competing interests — such as protectionist farmers and export industries — rarely face off
inside the LDP.  For this reason, the LDP often finds it difficult to make trade-offs among
its various constituencies.  The result is often paralysis or incremental changes at the margins
of policy. Koizumi has been changing this somewhat by centralizing more power in the
prime minister’s office, at the expense of the PARC and the bureaucracies.  
The Factional Nature of the Liberal Democratic Party.  The LDP has been the
dominant political force in Japan since its formation in 1955.  It is not a political party in the
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traditional sense because it has long been riven by cliquelike factions that jealously compete
for influence with one another.  For instance, cabinet posts, including the office of prime
minister, typically have been filled not on the  basis of merit or policy principles but rather
with a view toward achieving a proper balance among faction leaders, who act behind the
scenes as kingpins. Because the LDP president (who de facto becomes Japan’s prime
minister) is not the true leader of the party, he often lacks the power to resolve divisive
intraparty disputes or even to set the party’s agenda.  Koizumi has altered this situation
somewhat.  One of his most significant political reforms has been the partial neutralization
of party factions.  He has accomplished this in part by refusing to give the most numerically
powerful factions key cabinet posts. 
Over time, one result of the LDP’s opaque, top-down decisionmaking structure has been
its inability to adapt quickly to changes in Japanese society.  The LDP has coddled many of
Japan’s declining sectors, such as the agriculture and construction industries, which have
provided the money and manpower for the party’s political activities.  Corruption has thrived
in this machine-politics system; over the past thirty years many of the LDP’s top leaders have
been implicated in various kickback scandals.  Compounding the problem is that Japan’s
electoral districting system overweights rural voters compared with more reformist-minded
urbanites; each rural vote is worth an estimated two urban votes. 
Over the past decade, a bloc of independent voters has arisen opposing the LDP’s
“business as usual” political system.  Urban, younger, and increasingly female, this pool of
independents has shown itself willing to support politicians, such as Koizumi, who appear
sincerely committed to reform (although when pressed, many of these same voters oppose
specific structural — and potentially painful — economic reforms).  Thus, the LDP is under
severe, perhaps unmanageable, stress: to succeed in future elections, it must become more
appealing to the new generation of reform-minded voters.  Yet, if it adopts political and
economic reforms, it risks antagonizing its traditional power base.  This tension appears to
have been at work in the July 2004 Upper House elections, in which the LDP’s traditional
supporters failed to back the party in their usual numbers, yet many pro-reform voters turned
not to Koizumi but to  the newly energized alternative, the DPJ.
The Opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).  Until the November 2003
Lower House election, Koizumi’s popularity had weakened the DPJ, which describes itself
as “centrist” and currently is led by Katsuyo Okada.  The LDP lost seats in the November
election, while the DPJ raised its seat count from 137 to 177.  The DPJ benefited from
publishing a detailed policy manifesto for the election — a rarity in Japan — and from its
September 2003 absorption of another political grouping, a move that helped unify
opposition to the LDP for the first time in years.  In the 2004 Upper House campaign, DPJ
candidates ran on a platform of opposition to Japan’s deployment to Iraq and to the LDP’s
pension reform plan.  The DPJ’s approval ratings have risen to the 25%-30% range in many
polls, compared with the 35%- 40% range for the LDP.  The DPJ was formed in April 1998
as a merger among four smaller parties.  A fifth grouping, Ichiro Ozawa’s conservative
Liberal Party, joined the DPJ in September 2003.  However, the amalgamated nature of the
DPJ has led to considerable internal contradictions, primarily between the party’s
hawkish/conservative and passivist/liberal wings.  In particular, the issue of revising the war-
renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese constitution is generating considerable internal debate
in the DPJ.  As a result, on many issues the DPJ has not formulated coherent alternative




S. 384 (DeWine).  Amends the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act of 2000 to
extend from four to six years the existence of the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial
Government Records Interagency Working Group.  Introduced February 15, 2005. 
H.R. 30 (Mica).  To provide compensation for certain World War II veterans who survived
the Bataan Death March and were held as prisoners of war by the Japanese. Introduced
January 4, 2005; referred to House Committee on Armed Services.  Similar legislation in the
108th Congress (H.R. 595) did not see action outside of committee.
